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It has been the vogue to be progressive. Willingness to accept new ideas, sense of 
community responsibility toward the Negro, feeling of common purpose, and 
relative prosperity have given North Carolina a more sophisticated politics than 
exists in most southern states (Key, 1949, p. 210). 
V.O. Key, Jr. recognized North Carolinians' self-conscious and self-perpetuated image of 
themselves as a "progressive plutocracy." For black Tar Heels, however, the long struggle for 
voting rights and racial equality has more closely resembled a progressive paradox. For example, 
North Carolinians have been taught to remember Governor Charles Brantley Aycock as the 
"education governor," bringing progressive reform in public education to the state at the turn of 
the century.1 Blacks might also recall that Aycock rode to power as an advocate of black
disfranchisement. 
Similarly in 1 954, Greensboro, North Carolina, became the first city in the South to 
announce that it would comply with the Supreme Court's school desegregation edict. However, the 
Pearsall plan, the state law passed in response to Brown v. Board of Education, provided that local 
school districts or individual schools within them could close down rather than desegregate. In 
197 1 ,  after loss of federal funds and under court order, Greensboro finally integrated its public 
schools, making it one of the last in the region to do so (Chafe, ! 980, pp. ! 3 ,  53-60, 220-222). 
Among southern states, North Carolina has often been thought of as different, usually in a 
way that reflected favorably on it as more progressive or less blatantly racist. The Voting Rights 
Act itself recognized that North Carolina was different by including less than half of its hundred 
counties under the coverage of the original act. Before the Act was passed in 1965, the state had 
an estimated 46.8% of its black voting age population registered, the most of any of the seven 
states originally covered (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1975, p.43) .2
The experience with the Voting Rights Act reflects how North Carolina's performance has 
been "better" in some respects, but it also shows the limitations of the "progressive" stance for 
concrete movements towards racial equality. One observer characterizes the North Carolina 
experience up to 1980 by contending that "one of the few Southern states that has been moderate 
in race relations has been most effective in belittling the voting strength of a sizable black 
population" (Suitts, 1 98 1 ,  p. 78). Perhaps the progressive image was a less blatant and therefore 
more effective way to maintain a system of white supremacy. 
The groundbreaking 1984 lawsuit Gingles v. Edmisten3 was a response to the facts that
rates of black office-holding still lagged, that state election law and the forms of local government 
were slow to reform, and that racially polarized campaigns and voting still characterized North 
Carolina elections. Yet by now, a quarter century after the passage of the Voting Rights Act, the 
barriers of tradition have been substantially broken. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the 
effects of the Voting Rights Act on black participation and office-holding in North Carolina. In 
general, we will show that there has been substantial progress, much of which is to be attributed 
to the Act. After a more detailed look at the context of North Carolina politics, we consider 
changes in voter activity and office-holding by race. 
I Demographic and Historical Context 
North Carolina's black population is 22 percent of the total. Much of it is concentrated in 
the historical "black belt" in the eastern section of the state. There is also substantial black 
population in the cities of the central piedmont. These cities, Raleigh, Durham, Greensboro, 
Winston-Salem, and Charlotte, are the largest in what is still one of the least urban of American 
states. 
North Carolina's Native American population is the largest east of the Mississippi, making 
it the second major minority group in the state. Native Americans constitute I. I percent of the 
total population of North Carolina. They are concentrated in three counties, Robeson, Hoke and 
Swain, in two of which they are a plurality. The Voting Rights Act paid particular attention to 
these counties by placing them under the amended provisions for protection because of the effect 
of election laws on racial and language minorities. 
-Blacks maintained a persistent presence on the political stage in North Carolina throughout 
the postbel!um period. The state's Reconstruction constitution of 1 868 established universal 
manhood suffrage, thus eliminating racial and property qualifications for voting. In the 
registration rolls created by the ruling Republicans in 1 868, 36 percent of the new voters were 
former slaves (N.C. Advisory Committee, 1962, p. 16). The freedmen continued to register and 
cast ballots, with their turnout reaching 83 percent in the 1 880 elections, surpassing the white rate 
(Kousser, 1974, p. 1 5) .  
The restoration of county government under the new constitution, and the existence of 
strong alternatives to the dominant Democratic party (Republicans and later the 
Republican/Populist Fusion movement) gave North Carolina blacks access to a variety of elected 
and appointed positions until the turn of the century. As a rule, "the darker the district," be it a 
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city ward,. a county, a legislative post, or a Congressional seat, the more frequent its black 
representation. Four blacks represented the Second Congressional District, the "Black Second" 
between 1 868 and 1 90 1 ,  serving a total of seven terms (Edmunds, 1 95 1 ,  pp. 97- 1 1 7; Anderson, 
1 98 1 ). George White, the last of these, was the last black member of Congress until 1929, and the 
last from the South until 1973 (Swain, forthcoming).  These representatives were able to secure a 
measure of federal patronage for their black constituents, especially jobs as postmasters, recorders 
of deeds, tax collectors, and even a turn as the collector of customs for the port of Wilmington 
(Edmunds, 1951 ,  pp. 124-1 36). 
Between 1 876 and 1900, 59 blacks sat in the state House and eighteen blacks were elected 
to the state Senate, all from districts drawn from sixteen majority black counties. They were 
almost without influence in the white dominated legislature, and were only truly active on "race 
issues" such as black education, election laws, and convict labor, but they did hold some important 
committee assignments (Logan, 1964, p. 26). Local black communities also captured county and 
municipal posts. Numerous blacks were elected as magistrates, and a handful became sheriffs and 
county commissioners. Black aldermen were also scattered on the boards of several eastern and 
piedmont cities, including Raleigh, Wilmington, Tarboro, and New Bern (Edmunds, 1951 ,  pp. 
1 24 - 1 36). Still, white allies were unenthusiastic about black officeholding, and blacks never 
exercised political power commensurate with their numbers. 
North Carolina Democrats, motivated by the specter of "Negro domination" and the desire 
for one-party hegemony, sought to eliminate this limited black political strength from the time 
they first regained control of the state government in 1 870 until the culmination of their efforts in 
the disfranchising constitutional amendments of 1 900. They experimented with a number of 
intermediate steps to deny the ballot to the blacks and poor whites who made up the Republican 
and Populist constituencies, and specifically to dilute black voting strength. In 1 877 the General 
Assembly replaced the popular vote with legislative control of county government. Other bills 
redrew ward lines in�cities with heavy black populations, either to limit black influence to one 
district or to disperse it through several. This maneuvering, along with violent terror, gave the 
white Democratic minority control over the eastern black belt (Logan, 1964, p. 57). 
One of the most effective early disfranchisement measures was the centralization of 
control over elections and the establishment of intricate procedures for voter registration. A new 
and highly partisan State Board of Elections supervised the appointment of local registrars and 
judges of elections. The key features of the statutes were the large amount of discretion granted 
to the local clerks, the specificity of the information required of the registrant, the limited times 
the books were open, and the provisions allowing challenges of a voter's qualifications to be made 
on the day of the election, thus making it more difficult for the challenged would-be voters to 
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clear their record in time to vote (Mabry, 1940, p. 63). Even where impartially administered, such 
laws significantly diminished turnout from their inception in the late 19th century through the 
1960s. 
The registration scheme, however, like the other election chicanery, was by no means fool 
proof. Since the techniques relied on discriminatory administration, a change in the control of 
state government might reverse the direction of discrimination in voter registration. Federal 
regulation of voter registration and elections, a feature of the narrowly defeated "Force Bill" of 
1 890, might eliminate the advantage entirely. In fact, Democrats lost control of the legislature in 
1 894 to a "Fusion" ticket of Populists and Republicans, 
which replaced the above noted Democratic registration schemes with what Morgan Kousser has 
called "probably the fairest and most democratic election law in the post-Reconstruction South" 
( 1 974, p. 1 87). 
With this law, the Fusion ticket prevailed again in the 1 896 legislative elections, when 
Republican Daniel Russell won a four year term as governor. But the Democrats regained the 
legislature in 1 898 and reformulated the election law again. This time, however, Democratic 
leaders sought the permanent and constitutional elimination of the names of blacks from the 
electorate. In the face of opposition from blacks and some white dissenters, the 1900 election 
returned a victory for Democratic gubernatorial candidate Charles Aycock, and for a package of 
disfranchisement amendments that differed only in minor ways from those used in the rest of the 
South. The central provision was a requirement that "persons offering to vote shall be at the time 
a legally registered voter." In order to be registered, potential voters "shall be able to read and 
write any section of the constitution in the English language," and shall have paid a poll tax. 
Lawmakers faced a problem in that one fifth of the white population was illiterate, while 
half of the adult black population was literate. A fair application of the test would have 
disfranchised over 50,000 whites and left almost 60,000 blacks on the rolls (Edmunds, 1 95 1 ,  p. 
204). A grandfather clause excused voters from the literacy test if they were entitled to vote in 
any state in 1867, or were a lineal descendent of such a person. (In order to be eligible for this 
possibility, voters had to be registered as such by 1908.) (North Carolina Government. 1 585- 1979, 
p. 890.) North Carolina has never had a system of white primaries, and the poll tax was repealed
as a requirement for voting in 1920. Thus the main institutional feature of the effort to restrict 
black voting in North Carolina was the literacy test as a part of the registration requirement, and 
the discretion granted to local registrars--precisely what was to be suspended by the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. 
The suffrage restriction mechanisms secured white supremacy and Democratic solidarity. 
The Fusion movement had collapsed, the Republican party turned lily-white, and black efforts to 
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challenge the amendments in court failed. By 1910  almost no blacks voted and white turnout had 
dropped substantially (Kousser, p. 236). Apathy spread throughout the electorate as blacks all but 
disappeared from the public life of the state. 
Black plaintiffs did challenge the legality of the literacy requirement in court, but without 
success. In 1936, two black school teachers sued their county registrar and the state for a 
judgment outlawing the literacy test. The court decision evaluated the individual application of 
the literacy requirement without threatening the principle. In fact, the defendents admitted that 
the plaintiffs were qualified to vote. In a curious non seouitur the North Carolina Supreme Court 
endorsed the literacy requirement, saying that "this constitutional amendment providing for an 
educational test . . .  brought light out of the darkness as to education for all people of the state. 
Religious, educational, and material uplift went forward by leaps and bounds."4
The courts continued to protect North Carolina's registration procedures through the 
1 950s. In 1959, the United States Supreme Court affirmed a decision by the North Carolina 
Supreme Court upholding the use of the literacy requirement. 5 In 1961 , the North Carolina
Supreme Court qualified its earlier rulings, striking down the practice of requiring registrants to 
write the North Carolina Constitution from dictation, but it upheld the requirement that all 
applicants of uncertain ability be required to show a capacity to read and write the North Carolina 
Constitution. 6 The ruling seemed to have little effect, as evidenced by 750 complaints filed by
blacks in 1962 with the North Carolina Advisory Committee to the Civil Rights Commission, 
documenting discriminatory application of the literacy test (N.C. Advisory Committee, 1962, p. 
24). 
Meanwhile, the black electorate struggled to grow. In 1 940 only five percent of the 
eligible black electorate was registered, but by 1956 the fraction had risen to one fifth, by 1960 to 
a third, and by 1965 to over 45 percent (Key, 1949, p. 256; Crowell, 1984, p .  ! ). The proportions 
registered were lower in the heavily black counties in the east than in the whiter western counties. 
In 1960, in the 23 majority black counties, less than 20 percent of eligible blacks were registered 
(N.C. Advisory Committee, 1962, p. 24). 
In contrast, pockets of black voting and even black office-holding did develop in some 
piedmont cities. For example, in Winston-Salem, a militant black labor union local began building 
a black electorate in the mid-1940s, and by 1947 a black was voted onto that city's Board of 
Aldermen, becoming the first black public official elected in North Carolina in this century. In 
Durham, an upper middle class black community had begun a political organization in the 1 930s. 
This group, which was associated with the city's black insurance and banking industry, increased 
the local black electorate to an important force in local elections, and by 1953 a black insurance 
executive had been elected to the city council. The tradition of black politics continued in these 
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cities until, by 1 960, 62 percent of Durham's eligible black population was registered, as was 54 
percent of Winston-Salem's, 34 percent of Greensboro's, and 27 percent of Raleigh's (N.C. 
Advisory Committee, p. 24). 
After blacks were elected to public office in several cities in the 1940s and 1 950s, 
concerned whites borrowed from the earlier strategies of the 1870s and 1 880s to dilute black 
voting strength by changing district lines or electoral systems. In Winston-Salem, the prospective 
election of a black led to a demand for city-wide elections. This was denied, and even after the 
election of a black to the Board of Aldermen in 1947, a single member district plan that localized 
black influence in a "safe" ward was implemented (Winston-Salem Journal, March 19, 1947, p. I; 
September 22, 1948, p. 1 ). When a black won election in Wilson in 1953 and 1955, the legislature 
changed the city's electoral system from district to at-large, and Wilson's city council became all 
white again (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1 98 1 ,  pp. 47-48; Suitts, 1 98 1 ,  p. 67). 
The state mounted a more concentrated effort in the 1950s as the threat of the black vote 
loomed larger and the national legal campaign against disenfranchisement gained momentum. 
While passing anti-integration legislation for the public schools, the General Assembly passed a 
law that would prohibit "bullet voting" in fourteen mostly eastern North Carolina counties. The 
law invalidated votes cast for only one candidate in a multimember district, and was obviously 
aimed at black strategies of voting for a single black, and thereby denying any of their votes to a 
competitor who might defeat him. (This act was declared unconstitutional by the federal courts in 
1972. 7) Lawmakers also turned aside a bill that would have made school board positions elected
instead of appointed. 
II The Effect of the Voting Rights Act on Voter Registration. 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibited all practices that denied the right to vote on 
grounds of race or color (Section 2). The Act also identified several "covered jurisdictions" for 
special treatmentif they used a device such as a literacy test, and if they had less than 50% 
turnout in the 1964 Presidential election (Section 4). Six southern states were entirely covered on 
these grounds, and some 40 of North Carolina's 100 counties were covered by this presumption of 
discriminatory use of a test. Wake County, which includes Raleigh, the state capital, successfully 
sued for exemption, while Gaston County was denied exemption in an important case defining a 
limit on the possibilities of becoming exempt (U.S.Commission on Civil Rights, 1975, pp. 1 3-14). 
In the latter case, the Court held that the Gaston County black schools were so poor that no 
literacy test could avoid discriminating on the grounds of race. 8
Literacy tests were automatically suspended in all covered counties. The Act also provided 
that federal examiners or observers be sent into covered jurisdictions when the Attorney General 
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of the United States receives 20 written complaints of exclusion from voting on grounds of race. 
Although the state's black leadership urged oversight from Washington, no North Carolina county 
was ever designated for federal examiners (U.S.Commission on Civil Rights, 1 975, pp. 3 1 - 34; 
198 1 ,  pp. 1 0 1 - 1 04). 
Therefore, when we assess the direct consequences of the Voting Rights Act on voter 
registration in North Carolina, we are assessing the importance of the unenforced suspension of 
the literacy test in the covered counties. We do know that the literacy test continued to be used in 
some non-covered counties as late as 1970, the year that the amendments to the Voting Rights Act 
permanently suspended literacy tests, and that the State Board of Elections did not instruct these 
counties to discontinue such use until December 1 970.9 The political atmosphere may well have 
changed after the passage of the Act, and this may have affected behavior in both covered and 
uncovered jurisdictions. We do not have direct knowledge that literacy tests were suspended, 
though this is implied by the fact that no examiners were sent. 
Joel Thompson has carefully documented changes in voter registration in both covered and 
uncovered counties. He found that the percentage of eligible blacks registered to vote in the 
covered counties increased from 32.4 percent in 1964, before passage of the Act, to 54.0 percent 
in 1976. In the same time period, white registration had increased by only 3 . 1  percent, to just 
over 80 percent. There had been less than one percentage point net change in both white and 
black registration in forty matched counties that were not covered by the Act (Thompson, 1986, 
pp. 143- 1 45). (These comparisons should be interpreted with caution, because the state began 
purging registration rolls in 1972. Reports of white registration rates of over 80 percent are 
almost certainly inflated.) There have been even more spectacular gains since 1965 in individual 
covered counties. In thirty counties black voter registration has doubled, while in seven it has 
more than tripled, and in three blacks have become a majority of the registered electorate 
(Crowell, 1984, p .  6. See Table 11). 
Thompson's·figures provide powerful support for the claim that the coverage of the Act 
made a difference, even without external enforcement by federal examiners. They suggest also 
that the rule of thumb used to identify discriminatory use of the literacy test (less than 50 percent 
turnout in a presidential election) was reasonable. A measure of what the Act did not do for voter 
registration can be found in the continuing difference as of 1976 between black and white 
registration rates in both covered (54 vs. 8 1  percent) and uncovered (65 vs. 89 percent) counties, 
and also in the difference between black registration rates in the covered and uncovered counties 
(54 vs. 65) (Thompson, 1986, p. 144). 
In the state as a whole, there has been a unique pattern of change since the passage of the 
Act. There has not been the dramatic statewide increase in black registration found in some other 
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states, such as Mississippi, where black registration was previously much lower than in North 
Carolina. Instead, there has been a convergence of black and white rates that reflected slow and 
steady growth of black registration and a slight decline in white registration. The fraction of the 
electorate which was black grew from 1 8  to almost 27 percent in covered counties between 1966 
and 1 988, while the fraction grew from 12 to 15 in the uncovered counties in the same period. As 
of 1990 the statewide percentage of eligible blacks registered (63) approached the percentage for 
whites (69), while 47 percent of the Native American population was registered. 
III The Effect of the Voting Rights Act on Election Law 
The Voting Rights Act includes a provision (Section 5) that demands that procedural 
changes in covered jurisdictions be submitted for approval (preclearance) to the U.S. Attorney 
General or to the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia. Such changes were to 
include "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure 
with respect to voting." According to Abigail Thernstrom, this had originally a very limited aim, 
"guarding against renewed disfranchisement, the use of the back door once the front door was 
blocked" ( 1987, p. 20), although, according to the Civil Rights Commission, "Congress intended to 
include a very broad range of subjects under section 5" (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1975, p. 
26). 
There has been a variety of efforts in covered states to dilute the impact of a newly 
enfranchised black electorate by, for example, redrawing district lines or shifting from single 
member districts to at-large elections. Some of the most flagrant of these efforts were in 
Mississippi (Parker, 1990). In Allen v. State Board of Elections10 in 1969, the Supreme Court
said that Section 5 preclearance was relevant to such changes. Speaking for the Court, Chief 
Justice Warren said that the Voting Rights Act "was aimed at the subtle, as we!! as the obvious, 
state regulations which would have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of 
race" (cited in Thernstrom, pp. 22-23).
In response to the Voting Rights Act's unprecedented challenge to accepted practice, 
North Carolina quietly borrowed some of the strategies of deep South states like Mississippi to 
dilute the emerging black vote. The General Assembly relinquished its central powers and 
authorized some localities to alter their form of government in an effort to evade compliance. In a 
1966 special session, the legislature authorized 49 boards of county commissioners, which had had 
some form of election or residency by districts, to adopt an at-large election system. Twelve 
counties took immediate steps. Six converted to at-large elections, and six changed the boundaries 
of their wards. The state also shifted from past practice and required at-large election of all 
school boards. 
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.. This extensive state interest in state election law took place under the purview of the 
Voting Rights Act and the preclearance requirements of Section 5 ,  but very few changes were 
submitted for review and none were objected to before 1 97 1 .  Of the 88 changes in election law 
proposed between 1965 and 1 97 1 ,  only twelve passed through federal oversight, and all twelve 
were approved. In 1971 the Justice Department interceded in six cases to block the continued 
application of the literacy test, and it ruled on a few at-large election schemes and annexations, 
and on the statewide numbering of House and Senate seats. According to a tabulation by Steve 
Suitts, there were 1 93 legislative acts passed by the General Assembly between 1965 and 1979 
affecting local electoral schemes. Of these, only about twenty percent were submitted for review 
under Section 5 (Suitts, 1 98 1 ,  pp. 72-73). Subsequently the number has risen, and, according to a 
Justice Department table that does not entirely agree with Suitts's figures, a total of 4,416 changes 
were submitted from North Carolina between 1970 and 1987. According to the same table, 107 
objections were interposed in the same period. (Some apparent discrepancies may be due to the 
fact that Suitts is describing laws, each of which may include multiple changes.) 
Although Suitts acknowledges some margin of error, he argues that "the overwhelming 
majority of legislative changes has not been submitted for review and does not comply with the 
law . . . .  a benign explanation for these nonsubmissions has not been readily apparent" ( 198 1 ,  pp. 
72-73). Suitts contends that the failure to submit changes by local governments and legislative 
officers cannot be attributed to a lack of knowledge about the requirements of the Voting Rights 
Act. The fact that some submissions have been made for each of the covered counties indicates 
that selective judgments have been made about what needed to be submitted for review. 
While North Carolina lawmakers were not eager to change the racial complexion of state 
politics, they may not have been as conspiratorial as Suitts implies. Given a Justice Department 
that did not vigorously pursue its own interpretations, it was up to states and localities to initiate 
the process of preclearance. North Carolina had to wait along with the rest of the South for the 
language of the Voting Rights Act to be interpreted in the series of precedent-setting lawsuits of 
the late 1960s and 1970s over what kinds of legislative changes required preclearance. North 
Carolina has the added confusion of having only 40 of its 100 counties covered by the federal 
mandate. Decisions regarding election law and the Voting Rights Act have thus rested with 40 
different elections boards and county attorneys, with little or no supervision from the legislature 
or the state board of elections. 
IV The Election of Blacks to Public Office 
The remainder of this chapter assesses the consequences of the Voting Rights Act on the 
election of blacks to public office. This is, of course, only one of the consequences that might be 
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investigated. There are many kinds of public policy results to be expected from the effective 
enfranchisement of the black population (Keech, 1968). The election of blacks is by far the most 
easily measured, and this is the main reason that it is the focus of our attention. In effect, we are 
investigating in this section the effect of the Voting Rights Act on descriptive representation 
(based on race) rather than on substantive representation (based on interests and preferences). As 
Carol Swain documents and explains, the relationship between descriptive and substantive 
representation of African-Americans is far from simple. The election of blacks to public office is 
(fortunately) not the only way to assure that black interests are considered in public life (Swain, 
forthcoming). 
As the unique experience of the urban piedmont showed, and the subsequent history of 
the state in the wake of the Voting Rights Act continues to illustrate, white voters have not been 
uniformly unwilling to vote for black candidates. Furthermore, a black electorate has at times 
provided the margin of victory for sympathetic white candidates. 
As of 1990 there were 453 black elected officials in North Carolina serving in a variety of 
state, county, and municipal posts.11 At each level of government the effect of the Voting
Rights Act on black voting strength, districting arrangements, minority office-holding, and the 
relationship between minority candidates and white voters is felt differently. 
A. Statewide executive office and Congressional office. 
As yet no blacks have been elected to statewide executive office or to Congress, though a 
few have come close. Reginald Hawkins ran for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination in I 968 
and 1972. He came in third both times, but fell from 18.5 to eight percent of the votes cast in the 
first primary. In 1 976, Howard Lee, a black former mayor of Chapel Hill, narrowly led in the 
first primary for the Democratic nomination for lieutenant governor. But Jimmy Green, (who had 
received 27.35 percent to Lee's 27.71) ,  defeated Lee in the runoff by 56 to 44 percent. (In 1 977 
Lee was appointed head of the state Department of Environment, Health and Natural Resources, a 
post he held for over four years. In February 1990 he was appointed to fill a vacancy in the state 
Senate, and was elected to that post later in that year). 
Lee's experience, along with that of some blacks running for Congressional offices (see 
below), contributed to a belief that runoffs reduced the chances for blacks to win nomination and 
election to public offices that they might win otherwise. In response to pressures from the black 
community, the state law was changed in 1989 to provide that a runoff be held only if the leading 
candidate in the first primary were held to less than 40 percent of the vote. 
In 1990, Harvey Gantt, a black former mayor of Charlotte, sought the Democratic 
nomination for the United States Senate, and ran first in the first primary with 37.51 percent, 
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which was short of the new threshhold. Even though a second primary was called, forcing a two­
person race between a white and a black, Gantt was able to win the nomination with almost 57 
percent, showing that under at least some circumstances, a runoff provision does not disadvantage 
a black candidate in a majority white electorate. In a race that commanded international 
attention, Gantt received 47 percent of the general election vote against three term incumbent 
Senator Jesse Helms, even though Gantt had led in some polls taken before the final week of the 
campaign. Gantt's losing margin was similar to that of the three white candidates who had lost to 
Helms in earlier Senate races, even though Helms introduced racial appeals into the campaign. 
(The main example was a television ad that suggested that white workers would lose jobs if the 
civil rights bill supported by Gantt were to pass.) 
1972 Helms 54% Galifianakis 46% 
1978 
1984 
1990 
Helms 55% 
Helms 52% 
Helms 53% 
Ingram 
Hunt 
Gantt 
45% 
48% 
47% 
Black candidates have run strong races to be the Democratic nominee for Congress in the 
second district, but none has won. In 1972, Howard Lee ran unsuccessfully against incumbent 
L.H. Fountain, who was first elected in 1952. In 1982, the year in which Fountain retired, H.M. 
"Mickey" Michaux ran first with 44 percent of the vote in the first primary to 33 percent for LT. 
"Tim" Valentine. Valentine subsequently won the second primary (with 54 percent) and the 
general election, and has held the seat since that time. This was the election that inspired much of 
the effort to create the change in the threshhold for avoiding a second primary.12 (Valentine
was challenged in the Democratic primary in 1984 by Kenneth Spaulding, a black, and he defeated 
Spaulding by 52 to 48 percent.) 
B. Statewide judicial office. 
More than a dozen blacks have been elected to statewide judicial office. In the state 
judicial system, overhauled in the mid-1960s, there are three tiers that involve statewide election: 
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Superior Court. All of these elections are 
partisan. Vacancies are filled by gubernatorial appointments, which last until the next general 
election, at which time the seat is filled for the remainder of the original term.13 
The Supreme Court has seven judges elected to eight year terms. One of these judges, 
Henry Frye, is black. Justice Frye was appointed to fill a vacancy in 1983, elected in 1 984, and 
re-elected to a full term in 1988. The Court of Appeals has twelve judges elected for eight year 
terms. Of these twelve seats, one has been occupied by black judges since 1978, and another since 
1982. Blacks first came to these seats by appointment, but they have won five different statewide 
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elections for the two seats. The only .black who. lost was a Republican appointee, who lost to 
another black in the general election. 
One seat on the Court of Appeals has been occupied continuously since 1982 by Judge 
Clifton E. Johnson, who was first appointed and then elected in that year, and re-elected in 1990. 
The other seat has had four black occupants since 1978, when Judge Richard Erwin was appointed 
and subsequently elected. He resigned in 1980, and was replaced in 1981 by Judge Charles L. 
Becton, who was elected in 1984 and resigned in 1990. He was replaced by Judge Allison Duncan, 
a Republican, who was defeated for re-election by Judge James A. Wynn, Jr., another black, in 
that same year. Other than Judge Duncan, all are Democrats. 
The trial level of the statewide judicial system is called the Superior Court. These judges · 
are nominated in partisan primaries in electoral districts, but they are elected in statewide partisan 
elections for eight year terms. The question of district versus statewide election of trial court 
judges has been a serious and persistent one in North Carolina since Reconstruction. In 1 868 the 
Republican dominated constitutional convention first created a system of popularly elected 
superior court judges. The convention mandated that the elections be in districts in order to 
ensure that Republican strength, which was concentrated in pockets through the state, would be 
protected. In 1 875, after regaining control of the legislature, the Democrats amended the state 
constitution to shift to statewide election of superior court judges. This would reward Democratic 
power across the state, dilute the Republican strongholds, and prevent the election of black 
judges. Statewide election of superior court judges remained in place until it was amended by a 
Voting Rights Act inspired lawsuit in 1987. 
The number of superior court judges is set by the General Assembly. Before 1987, there 
were 64 "regular" judges, supplemented by from two to eight "special" judgeships. These special 
judgeships were created by the General Assembly and appointed by the governor for four year 
terms. Between 1900 and 1986, two blacks had served as "regular" superior court judges. One was 
Clifton Johnson, mentioned above, who was elected in 1978 and subsequently elevated to the 
Court of Appeals in 1982. The other was Terry Sherrill, who resigned in 1990 after conviction for 
cocaine possession. The special judgeships had been an important vehicle for the appointment of 
blacks in the 1960's and 1970's, but few had become regular judges (Drennan, 1990, p. 20). 
The system of selecting superior court judges was changed in 1 987 in response to several 
lawsuits filed under the Voting Rights Act. The first suit, Haith v. Martin, filed in 1 985,14 
determined that the state had failed to submit for preclearance several acts regarding judicial 
election passed in the I 960's and l 970's. After subsequent submission, the federal Department of 
Justice rejected features involving numbered seats and staggered terms. 
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The state changed the law in response to the numbered seat issue, but was challenging the 
decision on staggered terms when another suit was filed under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 
Alexander v. Martin15 challenged the use of staggered terms, large multi-judge districts for
primaries, and statewide general elections. The remedies under Section 2 could be much broader 
than simply the rejection of changes, as provided by the preclearance features of Section 5, and 
the state responded to the suit by changing the law before a judgment was issued. 
The new law was introduced by a black representative from Durham, and, after it passed 
in 1 9871 6, the relevant litigation was dropped. The legislation created nine new judgeships, and
eliminated the special judges. It subdivided six former single-county, multi-judge districts into 
multiple districts providing for several "safe" black seats, and it eliminated staggered terms in 
these counties17. The law also split ten multi-county, multi-judge districts into twenty single­
judge districts, of which two had majorities of black or other minority groups. (Drennan, 1 990, 
pp. 16-2 1 ). Subsequently, eleven black judges and one Native American have been elected to 
superior court. Two of the black judges were elected from seats that were not created especially 
to elect blacks.18
The experience with judgeships shows that it is possible for blacks to be elected statewide 
in North Carolina. All of the elections have come after the original passage of the Voting Rights 
Act. Most of them have been a direct result of litigation under the 1982 amendments to the Act, 
and have been based on nominations from districts designed to generate black nominees. Still, 
several elections, especially those to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, demonstrate the 
possibility that blacks can win open statewide election under more normal circumstances. The 
general rule seems to have been for black judges to run for re-election as incumbents after 
initially gaining the office by appointment. Since judicial elections did not involve much 
campaigning, they were not very visible. This fact surely helped blacks to win these statewide 
elections. However, this "advantage" for blacks may not last because partisan competition and 
open campaigning for judicial office have increased steadily in recent years.19
C. The General Assembly. 
Black representation in the state legislature has increased substantially since 1 968, when 
the first black in this century was elected to the House. (See Table 1 1 .) The number has risen to 
5 blacks among 50 senators, and 1 3  blacks among 120 House members. The largest jump was 
from 3 to 1 1  black members of the House after the 1982 election. There is also one Native 
American, representing Robeson county. These changes followed the filing of Gingles v. 
Edmisten. 20 which was to become on the national level one of the most important cases
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implementing the Voting Rights Act, but change in North Carolina came before the decision was 
handed down. 
The suit challenged the 1 98 1  redistricting of General Assembly seats, and the provision of 
the North Carolina Constitution that counties not be divided in creating election districts. It 
contended that the constitutional provision had been in use since 1 967, without having been 
precleared as required by Section 5. After the suit was filed, the state did submit the questioned 
practices, and both the constitutional provision and the 1981 districting plan were denied 
preclearance. 
The General Assembly responded to the objections by enacting a new redistricting plan 
that contained five majority black House districts and one majority black Senate district. As 
indicated, the result was an increase of eight black members of the House (though no additional 
blacks in the Senate until the 1 984 election). The Gingles verdict, which was handed down on the 
district court level in 1 984 (after the 1 982 amendents to the Voting Rights Act), rejected the 
redistricting plan that had been adopted after the suit was brought. Single member districts were 
adopted in lieu of several former multi-member districts in an extra legislative session in 1984, 
and the primary elections were postponed until the new districts could be drawn. The increases 
that followed the Gingles decision were modest in the House (from eleven to thirteen by 1 985), 
but more dramatic in the Senate (from one to four by 1 989). 
The relationship between the Voting Rights Act, the Gingles case, and the increases in the 
number of blacks in the legislature is complicated. While the biggest changes came before the suit 
was resolved, it would be difficult and unreasonable to deny that they came in response to the 
filing of the suit. The mere existence of the Voting Rights Act of 1 965 was not enough to bring 
very substantial changes in the election of blacks to the legislature. Litigation was necessary to 
stimulate the requests for prec!earance that were required by the original act. Yet the initiation of 
litigation under the act was able to produce substantial changes even before a decision was issued. 
Indeed, the court itself acknowledged the claim that the election of additional blacks in 1 982 was 
a special case . 
. . . in some elections the pendancy of this very litigation worked a one-time advantage for 
black candidates in the form of unusual organized political support by white leaders 
concerned to forestall single-member districting.21
Clearly the threat of litigation under the act is capable of generating changes even before a 
verdict. North Carolina legislators were doubtless mindful of the Gingles experience as they 
carried out the 1 991  redistricting process. 
Blacks have achieved an important presence in the General Assembly in terms of policy 
impact and leadership positions (Jordan, 1989). Shortly after Harvey Gantt lost the 1 990 election, 
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which might have made him the first black United States Senator from the South since 
Reconstruction, Daniel T. Blue achieved a different historic first. Blue, a five term (ten year) 
member of the state House of Representatives, was chosen Speaker of that body. This choice of 
the Democratic House caucus made Blue the first black state house speaker in modern southern 
history (Christenson, 1 990). 
The more long term effects of the Voting Rights Act on the North Carolina General 
Assembly remain to be seen. The results of the 1 990 census have already begun another round of 
high stakes redistricting for seats in Congress and in the state House and Senate, perhaps the most 
significant redistricting since the passage of the Voting Rights Act. While largely beyond the 
scope of this essay, a more recently recognized and unanticipated effect of the shift to single 
member legislative districts in southern states like North Carolina has been to narrow the reach of 
the black electorate by drawing blacks out of larger multi-member districts. This in turn has 
made some Democratic incumbents more vulnerable to Republican challengers. Some formerly 
heterogeneous multi-member districts like Wake County (from which Representative Blue had 
been elected prior to the 1 984 shift) have, in essence, been split into black Democratic, white 
Democratic, white Republican, and rural and urban districts. 
D. County Commissions. 
We consider next the relationship between districting arrangements and the election of 
black and Indian officials in county governments. We begin with counties and follow with cities 
because counties are more comprehensive administrative unit. Every citizen lives in one of these 
jurisdictions, while not every citizen is included in cities. While we concentrate on county 
commissions, blacks serve in several other county level offices. In addition to the 44 black county 
commissioners (roughly five percent of the total membership on county boards), there are 64 
black members of county boards of education, and four black sheriffs. Native American office­
holding at the county level is limited to three members of Robeson county's seven member 
commission and two members of the county board of education, all of whom are elected at large. 
The tables comparing districting arrangements, minority population, and minority office­
holding follow the numbering scheme for the other essays in this volume, with the A series 
designating counties, and the B series designating cities. Table 1 - A  shows that as of 1 989, nine 
out of ten counties have at-large electoral systems for selection of county commissioners. Among 
these counties, there is a positive relationship between the size of the black population in the 
county and the percentage of commissioners who are black, though at most a quarter of the 
commissioners are black even in the eight most heavily black counties. The fraction of officials 
who are minority is consistently less than the relevant fraction of the population. 
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Only five counties have pure single member districts. Curiously, none of them is one of 
the eight counties in which minorities are a majority of the population. The fact that blacks are 
so underrepresented in majority black counties retaining at-large schemes would seem to indicate 
a situation ripe for change in districting arrangements. In the handful of counties with district 
elections, there is a much more nearly proportionate relationship between the fraction black in the 
electorate and the fraction black among the county commissioners than in the at large counties in 
the same population categories. Not surprisingly, the four counties with mixed systems fall in 
between. 
Table 2-A shows that there were small increases in black elected officials even in counties 
with unchanged electoral systems. This fact indicates that there were other changes in the activity 
of blacks, the willingness of whites to vote for blacks, or both during the last twenty years. We 
should keep in mind that these non-districting changes are likely also to be operative to some 
degree in the districts where the electoral arrangements were changed. Thus not all changes in 
these locales can be attributed to districting. On the other hand, to the extent that the districting 
changes were the result of preclearance objections or court suits, the counties in which these took 
place may have been counties that were especially resistant to black voting strength. 
Still, there is clear evidence that electoral arrangements make a difference. In the five 
districts that changed from at-large to single member status, and in the four that changed from 
at-large to mixed, all of the black elected officials were elected after the change. Table 3-A 
allows an assessment of the consequences of the electoral arrangements on the election of 
minorities while controlling for time and the identity of the county. In the four counties with 
mixed district and at-large components, most of the black commissioners were elected from the 
districts rather than from the entire county. 
Two measures of equity of representation are reported in Tables 4-A and 5-A. Equity I 
measures the difference between the minority percentage of the population and the minority 
percentage of the county boards, while Equity II measures the ratio of the fraction of the board 
that is minority to that of the population. Blacks and Native Americans are consistently under­
represented on county commissions regardless of districting arrangements, and regardless of time. 
Nevertheless, the equity measures confirm the observations of Tables 1 -A and 2-A that single 
member districts are the most proportionately representative system, followed by mixed systems. 
At-large plans are the least proportional, even when minorities are a clear majority of the 
population. Comparing the equity ratios across time, as Table 5-A does, it is also clear that, while 
the ratios in the unchanged counties "improved," much more substantial increases occurred after 
the adoption of some form of district election. 
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. Tables 6-A and 7-A allow a more detailed analysis of the influence of district election in 
North Carolina counties. The tables compare minority population with minority presence for each 
of the fifteen wards composing the five counties with single member plans. Within these few 
districts it appears that minorities must have a substantial majority (over 60 percent) before they 
can be assured of electing their own or of controlling county boards with people of their own 
ethnic group. (None of the three "Indian" counties employes district election.) 
E. City Councils. 
We consider finally the relationship between districting arrangements and the election of 
black and Indian officials in North Carolina cities. The picture in many ways parallels that 
presented above for county commissions. There are 260 black city council members (around ten 
percent of the total), 18 black mayors, and 19 black members of city school boards governing 
North Carolina cities, towns, and villages. 
As Table 1-B shows, over 90 percent of city councils are elected at-large, and in them the 
fraction of minority elected officials is miniscule, even in majority black cities. As with counties, 
there is a very small number of cities with single member districts, or with mixed at-large and 
single member district arrangements. These are locations in which the election of minority 
officials nearly approximates their fraction of the population. 
Over time there have been dramatic increases in the fraction of elected officials who are 
black in most of the groups of cities with changed arrangements, regardless of the type of change. 
As Table 2-B shows, in the great majority of cities there was no change in electoral arrangements, 
and in such cities there was much less of an increase in minority officials than in the changed 
cities. In the 144 cities with majority black populations, the jump in black office-holding 
between 1973 and 1989 was many times higher for the newly created plans than the increase in the 
static at-large locales. 
There is an important difference between city and county patterns that is not shown in the 
tables. For both counties and cities, there is within the at-large category a group of jurisdictions 
with elections at large, but with district residence or nomination requirements. Counties with 
these arrangements were similar to the pure at-large systems in electing very few blacks, but in 
the cities this system did almost as well as single member districts in producing minority officials. 
We speculate that this is because minority residential concentration is greater in cities than in 
counties. 
When a district is largely black, a candidate who must be a resident or nominated by 
residents is likely to be a black. Under such circumstances, district residence or nomination with 
at-large election can approach the success of single member districts in securing the election of 
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blacks. We suspect thatin cities these conditions of black residential concentration in districts are 
more likely to exist than in more sparsely populated counties. 
In cities that mixed district and at-large components (Table 3-B), the districts produced 
substantially larger numbers of blacks than did the at-large seats. This is not surprising, though it 
is an even more dramatic pattern than that found in the mixed systems in the counties. 
Of the 1 5  black council members from the 1 4  cities with mixed plans, only one was elected at 
large. Here too, we suspect that the districting arrangements paralleled segregated residential 
patterns in the cities more than in the counties. That is, we expect more black-dominated districts 
in cities than counties, and therefore even more blacks being elected from districts under these 
circumstances. A comparison between counties and cities of the numbers of districts in each 
population category (Tables 6-A and 6-B) bears out this expectation. 
In single member districts in the counties, 27 percent of the districts have majorities that 
are composed of minority groups, while 40 percent of such districts in the cities are dominated by 
minorities. Ironically, residential segregation of the races is important for allowing single member 
districts to facilitate the election of blacks. In the absence of such segregation, single member 
districts are far less effective in doing so. These issues are illustrated by a Granville County case 
to be discussed below. 
The equity measures for the cities (Tables 4-B and 5-B) are substantially higher than was 
the case in the counties, but they do echo the county comparisons between the electoral systems. 
In no case are minorities advantaged, but equity ratios go into the range between .9 and 1 .0 in 
both single member districts and in mixed systems. In none of the at-large cities did the ratio rise 
above . 15 .  
Tables 6-B and 7-B allow a more detailed analysis of the influence of district election in 
North Carolina cities. Here, in contrast to the counties analyzed above, it has been possible to 
elect blacks in single member districts where blacks are only a minority of the electorate. Not 
surprisingly, even larger proportions of council members are black in black majority districts. 
The fact that most North Carolina Indians live in a cluster of towns retaining at-large 
plans makes it difficult to discuss multi-ethnic voting within district systems. We can, however, 
take a closer look at the towns in Robeson county, where the Native American population is 
concentrated. (All but the county seat of Lumberton still operate without district election.) The 
voter registration rates for blacks and Native Americans in these towns are both very high. 
Assuming that Native Americans, blacks, and whites have comparable opportunities to vote, 
Native Americans are more seriously underrepresented than blacks on the local boards. 
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V The Role of Litigation 
As indicated in Tables 8-A, 8-B, 9-A, and 9-B, most of the changes in districting 
arrangements from at-large to single member or mixed systems in North Carolina counties and 
cities involved litigation or the threat thereof under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as 
amended in 1982. Of the 59 changes in county and city electoral systems that took place between 
1965 and 1991 ,  34 were induced by lawsuits or the threat thereof. Very few were as a result of 
Section 5 preclearance objections. Five connties and seven cities among the 40 jurisdictions 
originally covered under the Act were successfully sued under the amended Section Two. 
There were very few suits on the county or city level before Gingles, and only five suits 
were filed while that case was pending in district court. Soon after Gingles was decided, however, 
the plaintiffs in a suit against Halifax County won a favorable decision22• In response to these
decisions, at least thirty lawsuits were filed in the state pursuant to the Voting Rights Act, and at 
least five more controversies were resolved before filing by the threat of litigation. The use of at­
large elections has been challenged for at least twelve cities or towns, twenty counties, and seven 
Boards of Education. The majority of these suits have been sponsored by the N.A.A.C.P. (See 
Tables 9-A and 9-B.) North Carolina's voting rights case law has been constructed largely by a 
group of committed black and white attorneys, Leslie Winner, Romallus Murphy, Ronald Penny, 
Angus Thompson, and a few others. 
The outcomes of the litigation have been basically favorable to the plaintiffs, resulting 
about half the time in a negotiated agreement regarding the use of some districts and some at­
large seats before the case was even brought to trial. In only two lawsuits were plaintiffs offered 
no relief.23 Of the county and city government controversies that have been resolved through
the courts, thirteen resulted in pure district systems, and nineteen resulted in mixed systems. Four 
resulted in either limited voting or a combination of districts and limited voting, and two resulted 
in the elimination of the residency requirement that had been used in conjunction with at large 
elections. In several jurisdictions, e.g. Guilford, Wilson, Halifax, and Paquotank counties, and in 
Elizabeth City, High Point, and Lexington, litigation was associated with the creation of majority 
black districts in which blacks were elected. 24
A limit on the possibility of using the Voting Rights Act to secure the representation of 
blacks has been defined in Granville County. 25 This county is 43 percent black, but a maximum 
of two of seven districts could be drawn with a black majority. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit overturned a district court decision that had mandated limited voting. Specifically, 
it had provided for election of four and three seats at a time for staggered terms, but with each 
voter allowed only two votes per election. This was seen as a way to allow blacks to control more 
seats in a county where their substantial numbers were too dispersed to elect commissioners in 
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proportion to their numerical strength, but the argument was rejected by the higher court 
(Crowell, 1988, 1989). 
Granville County had not contested the fact that the original at-large system was 
discriminatory, and the plaintiffs had agreed that the county's new plan for seven single-member 
districts was drawn as well as could be expected, but they still pushed for a limited voting scheme 
as an alternative. The appellate court rejected the district judge's decision to dismiss the county's 
plan as an overly political ruling that substituted the judge's wisdom for the county's preference. 
The influence of the Voting Rights Act has also been felt on the remaining 25 county 
commissions and city councils that appear to have shifted from at-large systems "voluntarily," i.e. 
without the impetus of a lawsuit or threatened litigation. We suspect that the fear of possible 
litigation, especially in the post-Gingles environment, was enough to convince moderate white 
politicians who may have been wavering to undertake reform. Tables 8-A and 8-B reveal that all 
seven of the counties and ten out of the eighteen cities which shifted on their own to single­
member or mixed plans were subject to the direct scrutiny of the Justice Department under 
Section Five. The fact that, in retrospect, plaintiffs have tended to seek relief under Section Two 
and not Section Five does not diminish the perceived power of the mandate of the Voting Rights 
Act and the more specific notion of "coverage." The minority population of the counties and 
cities that changed "voluntarily" is also, on average, about nine percent higher than the minority 
population in the counties and cities undergoing legal action. While not a startling difference, the 
political incentives of a larger black population may have made the extra push of a lawsuit 
unnecessary. 
A comparison of Tables 8-A and 8-B also reveals that litigation inspired by the Voting 
Rights Act appears to have been much more instrumental in altering county systems than 
municipal bodies, About three fourths of the changes in county government were the result of 
lawsuits, while less than half of the new city systems had their genesis in court. While the 
"voluntary" counties are not geographically clustered, many of the cities which have implemented 
changes on their own are large (over 25,000) and are located in the central or Piedmont region of 
the state (e.g. Winston-Salem, Tarboro, Wilson, Raleigh, Cary, Charlotte, Greensboro, and 
Fayetteville). This circumstance bears out a general pattern in which the racial politics of the 
urban Piedmont has been relatively more progressive than the rest of North Carolina. 
The Granville case may be an important indicator for the future of litigation under the 
Voting Rights Act concerning methods of election in North Carolina. Specifically, the appellate 
ruling established the precedent for balancing plaintiff's desires with the ability of local 
governments to comply within the bounds of reason and fairness. More generally, the case 
suggests that after the first wave of suits following Gingles, which aimed at the more obvious and 
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"easy" targets, Jhe legal battles .are beginning to shift to locales where there are not simple 
remedies for an under-representation of blacks in elective office. 
V Conclusions. 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 has had a substantial impact in North Carolina. It 
culminated the 65 year struggle of black Tar Heels to rebuild the political community destroyed 
by disfranchisement, but the statute has also opened up an entirely new realm of possibilities. The 
original act facilitated substantial increases in black voter registration in the covered counties. 
However, the preclearance provisions of the original act were largely ignored in the state, and in 
Washington until the 1970s. It took litigation to force the preclearance that the law had required 
since 1965. The most notable examples concerned the judicial system and the state legislature, 
and in both cases the response was substantial. 
The possibility of minority voters suing to demand preclearance clearly made a difference 
in the behavior of state officials. State resistance was not substantial in the case of the judicial 
system, and the state's resolution of the problem led to the withdrawal of the lawsuit. For the 
legislative changes, the state did not give up its resistance until Gingles was resolved. The 1982 
amendments to Section 2 have surely made a difference in North Carolina by calling attention to 
the possibility of the use of the Voting Rights Act to block some changes and to secure others. 
The judicial changes show that substantial "voluntary" compliance is possible once the issue is 
raised. 
Most recently, political and legal energies have been focused on North Carolina counties 
and cities, for it is in these locales that the Voting Rights Act has opened up both the greatest 
opportunities and challenges for black electoral equality. Litigation inspired by the Act has 
induced changes in districting arrangements that, in turn, have led to much more nearly 
proportional representation for blacks. For a variety of reasons, however, an overwhelming 
number of these city and county electoral arrangements remain unchanged, and blacks and Native 
Americans continue to be under-represented on local boards, even when they are a majority of 
the population. 
The North Carolina experience raises questions about the common presumption that blacks 
cannot be elected in majority white districts. On the statewide level, Harvey Gantt came as close 
to winning a U.S. Senate seat as three white opponents of Senator Helms. Although nine of the 
judges elected statewide are products of a nominating system that is designed to assure the choice 
of a black, the fact remains that there are fourteen black judges elected statewide, and five of 
these are not products of such engineering. In 1991 five black members of the state House of 
Representatives (including Representative Michaux) and the one Native American member were 
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elected from majority ,white multi-member districts. The remaining eight black House members 
come from majority black single member districts. In the state Senate Howard Lee and one other 
black Senator serve majority white multi-member districts. The other three black Senators were 
elected from majority black single member districts. 
There have also been important local examples of blacks being elected in majority white 
districts. Howard Lee's election as mayor of Chapel Hill in 1969 was the first modern election of 
a black to such a position in a predominantly white community in the South. Harvey Gantt was 
elected mayor of Charlotte, the state's largest city, in 1 983.  The sheriff and the register of deeds 
of Wake County, the site of the state capitol, are black. The district attorney in Orange and 
Chatham counties is black. However, as our discussion of local elections makes clear, blacks are 
still not elected to county boards and city councils to a degree that approaches their fraction of the 
populations. 
North Carolina's progressive image has surely exaggerated the nature of the reality, as 
many of the observations in this essay make clear. It is true that the electoral successes of Justice 
Frye, Speaker Blue, Representative Michaux, Senator Lee, Mayor Gantt, Sheriff Baker, and 
numerous others prove that North Carolina whites are not consistently unwilling to support blacks 
for public office. But it cannot be ignored that in voting rights as in school desegregation, the 
state has also resisted movements towards racial equality and fairness. Many of the changes 
regarding voting rights issues would not have been made without the reality or the threat of 
litigation. 
The Voting Rights Act has clearly reshaped North Carolina politics, both in stimulating 
increasing black participation, and in securing procedural arrangements that facilitate the 
possibility of electing blacks to public office. North Carolina's experience a quarter century after 
the passage of the Voting Rights Act suggests both the importance of the federal mandate and the 
uniqueness of the state within the region. It is also clear that there are many perplexing issues 
regarding voting rights and political equality still to be faced. 
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TABLE l-A 
Proportion of Officials Minority by Election Plan 
North Carolina Counties 
ELECTION MEAN % MIN POP IN 1989 % MINORITY OFFICIALS IN 1989 
TYPE BY 
MINORITY 
POPULATION 
SMD N BLACK IND MIN BLACK IND MIN 
0-9.9 1 0.0 0.1  0.2 0;0 0.0 0.0 
10-29.9 1 25.0 0.4 25.4 14.3 0.0 14.3 
30-49.9 3 37.5 0.1  37.6 30.5 0.0 30.5 
50-100 Q 
Subtotal: 5 
MIXED 
0-9.9 0 
10-29.9 1 26.5 0.3 26.8 14.3 0.0 14.3 
30-49.9 3 38.6 0.8 39.4 12.2 0.0 12.2 
50-100 Q 
Subtotal: 4 
AT-LARGE1 
-
0-9.9 28 4.6 0.3 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
10-29.9 29 17.9 11 .5 29.4 5.8 0.0 5.8 
30-49.9 26 37.8 0.6 38.4 5.2 0.0 5.2 
50-100 J! 50.8 6.6 57.4 25.0 5.4' 30.4 
Subtotal: 91 
Grand Total: 100 
1 The "At-Large" category includes thirty-nine counties with "Other" systems, those combining at-large election with district 
residency and/or nomination requirements. Seven of these have 0-9.9 percent minority populations and about 5 percent of the 
membership of their boards are minorities. Sixteen have 30-49.9 percent minority populations and just over 3 percent of their 
commissioners are minorities. Six of these counties are majority-black and their boards are twenty percent minority. 
1 Robeson County has three Native Americans on its seven-member county commission in addition to four whites. The 
popuiation of ihe county is 35 percent Native American and 25 percent biack. Tne commissioners are nominated by district 
but are elected at-large. Robeson is the only county with Native Americans on its governing body. 
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TABLE l-B 
Proportion of Officials Minority by Election Plan 
North Carolina Cities 
ELECTION MEAN % MIN POP IN 1989 % MINORITY OFFICIALS IN 1989 
TYPE BY 
MINORITY 
POPULATION 
SMD N BLACK IND MIN BLACK IND MIN 
10-29.9 1 13.7 0.4 14. 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
30-49.9 8 39.4 0. 1 39.5 38.9 0.0 38.9 
50-100 :! 47.2 8.8 56.0 43.9 2.81 46.7 
Subtotal: 13 
MIXED 
10-29.9 5 22.0 0.2 22.2 18.3 0.0 18.3 
30-49.9 8 32.7 0.4 33.1  3 1.7 0.0 31 .7 
50-100 1 76.4 0. 1 76.3 40.0 0.0 40.0 
Subtotal: 14 
AT-LARGE2 
10-29.9 346 18.8 0.4 19.2 2.6 0.0 2.6 
30-49. 9  2163 38.0 1 . 1  39. l 5.3 0.0 5.3 
50-100 140 55.6 9.6 65.2 8.5 0.74 9.2 
Subtotal: 702 
Grand Total: 7295 
1 Lumberton has one Native American on its nine member board in addition to three blacks. 
2 The "At-Large ft cells include nineteen cities which are not "pure" at-large systems. They combine at-large election with 
district residency and/or nomination requirements. 
3 Durham has six members elected at-large and six elected at-large to wards. There are seven blacks on the board. 
� Pembroke's board is 100 percent Native American. It is the only city other than Lumberton with Native Americans on the 
city governing body. 
5 454 cities are excluded from this table because they have less than 9 .9 percent minority population. Seven of these 
excluded cities have "other" systems, three are Mmixed" systems, and one is a SMD. There are six bh!ck councilpersons from 
these cities; four from at-large systems, one from the SMD and one from a city in the "other" category. 
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TABLE2-A1 
Changes in Minority Representation Between 1973 and 1989 
North Carolina Counties 
MEAN % MIN POP IN 1989 % MINORITY OFFICIALS CITY BOARDS 
(1973) (1989) 
TYPE OF N BLACK IND MIN BLACK IND MIN BLACK IND MIN 
CHANGE BY 
MINORITY 
POPULATION 
AL-SMD 
0-9.9 0 
10-29.9 1 25.0 0.4 25.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.3 0.0 14.3 
30-49.9 3 37.5 0 .1  37.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.5 0.0 30.5 
50-100 Q 
Subtotal: 5 
AL-MIXED 
0-9.9 0 
10-29.9 1 26.5 0.3 26.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.3 0.0 14.3 
30-49.9 3 38.6 0. 1 38.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.2 0.0 12.2 
50-100 Q 
Subtotal: 4 
Total Changed: 9 
UNCHANGED SYSTEMS 
AT-LARGE 
0-9.9 28 4.5 0. 1 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
10-29.9 28 18.5 1 .6  20.1 1 . 8  0.0 1 . 8  3.4 0.0 3.4 
30-49.9 25 38.8 0.9 39.7 3.2 0.0 3.2 4.7 0.0 4.7 
50-100 � 50.8 6.6 57.4 5.0 0.0 5.0 25.0 5.4 30.4 
Subtotal: 89 
Grand Total: 982 
1 The categories in this table submerge the thirty-nine counties with "Other" systems. Four counties (all less than 30 percent 
minority) shifted from at-large to "Other" systems but still had no minority representation on their boards. Three counties (all 
with 30-49.9 percent minority populations) shifted from "Other" to mixed systems. The percentage of minority commissioners 
rose from 0 to 12.2 percent. Thirty-four counties retained their "Other" systems. The change in minority officeholding over 
time very nearly paralleled that for the fifty-one unchanged at-large counties. 
2 \Vashiugton and Cherokee counties were excluded because of the 1973 cut-off daie. Washington adopted a SMD system 
before 1973. Cherokee had a SMD system until 1978 and then shifted to at-large. 
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TABLE2-B1 
Changes in Minority Representation Between 1973 and 1979 
North Carolina Cities 
MEAN % MIN POP IN 1989 % MINORITY OFFICIALS CITY BOARDS 
(1973) (1989) 
TYPE OF N BLACK IND MIN BLACK IND MIN BLACK IND MIN 
CHANGE BY 
MINORITY 
POPULATION 
AL-SMD 
10-29.9 1 13.7 0.4 14.l 16.7 0.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
30-49.9 5 40.2 0 .1  40.3 1.7 0.0 1 .7  31 .3  0.0 31 .3  
50-100 J. 52.7 0.0 52.7 2.8 0.0 2.8 47.6 0.0 47.6 
Subtotal: 9 
AL-MIXED 
10-29.9 5 19.2 0.2 19.4 , 8.4 0.0 8.4 8.4 0.0 8.4' 
30-49.9 7 34.4 0.6 35.0 10.8 0.0 10.8 20.8 0.0 20.8 
50-100 1 76.3 0. 1 76.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 40.0 
Subtotal: 13 
Total Changed: 22 
UNCHANGED SYSTEMS 
AT-LARGE 
10-29.9 346 18.8 0.4 19.2 0.8 0.0 0.8 2.6 0.0 2.6 
30-49.9 216 38.0 1 . 1  39.l 1.4 0.0 1.4 5.3 0.0 5.3 
50-100 140 55.6 9.6 65.2 1 . 1  0.0 1 . 1  8.5 0.7 9.2 
Subtotal: 702 
Grand Total: 7243 
1 The cells in this table submerge the cities in the "Other" category of at-large election and district residency and/or 
nomination requirements. Four cities shifted from at-large to "Other" and two with majority-black populations went from having 
0 to 60 percent minority membership on their city boards. Four cities shifted from "Other" to Single-Member Districts. Two 
had 30-49.9 percent minority population and one was majority-black. In all three the percentage of minority officials on city 
boards rose from between 0 and .35 percent to almost 43 percent. Three cities shifted from "Other" to Mixed systems. In the 
two cities with 30-49.9 percent minority population, the percentage of minority officials rose from 8.35 to 41.7 percent. Fifteen 
cities retained their �Otherft systems through 1989 and so remained �unchanged", but the percentage of minority officials rose. 
Twelve of these cities had 10-29.9 percent minority population and the percentage of minority officials increased from 5.4 to 
13 .1 percent. Two cities had 30-49.9 percent minority population and their percentage of minority officials jumped from 8.4 to 
37 .5 percent.· In the one majority-black·city which retained its ft Other� system, the percentage of minority officials stayed even 
at 20 percent. 
2 This picture is somewhat distorted by lumping the �Other" and at-large categories together. The two at-large cities in this 
cell went from 0 to 16.7 percent minority officials when they changed from at-large to mixed. The one "Otherft city lost 
minority representation (16.7 to 0 percent) when it shifted from "Other" to mixed. 
3 Five cities are excluded from Table 2-B because shifts from at-large systems occurred before the 1973 cut-off year. The five 
are comprised of one mixed system and four singie member districts, The five are Tarboro, Winston-Salem, Raleigh, Plymouth, 
and Lumberton. 
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%MIN POP N 
0-9.9 0 
10-29.9 1 
30-49.9 3 
50-100.0 Q 
Total: 4 
TABLE3-A 
Minority Representation in 1989 in Mixed Plans 
By District and At-Large Components 
North Carolina Counties 
DISTRICT COMPONENTS AT-LARGE COMPONENTS 
BLACK IND MIN BLACK IND MIN 
25.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
30.5 0.0 30.5 16.7 0.0 16.7 
28 
%MIN POP N 
10-29.9 5 
30-49.9 8 
50-100.0 l 
Total: 14 
TABLE3-B 
Minority Representation in 1989 in Mixed Plans 
By District and At-Large Components 
North Carolina Cities 
DISTRICT COMPONENTS AT-LARGE COMPONENTS 
BLACK IND MIN BLACK IND MIN 
3 1.0 0.0 31.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
35.9 0.0 35.9 3 . 1  0.0 3 . 1  
50.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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TABLE4-A 
Mean Equity Measures 
Comparing Percent Minority On County Board in 1989 
with Percent Minority in Population in 1980 
North Carolina Counties 
ELECTION EQUITY I: DIFFERENCE EQUITY II: RATIO 
TYPE BY 
MINORITY 
POPULATION 
SMD N BLACK IND MIN BLACK IND MIN 
0-9.9 0 
10-29.9 1 -10.7 -0.4 -11 . 1  .57 .00 .56 
30-49.9 3 -7.0 -0.l -7.1 . 8 1  .00 .81  
50-100 Q 
Subtotal: 5 
MIXED 
0-9.9 0 
10-29.9 1 -12.2 -0.3 -12.5 .54 .00 .53 
30-49.9 3 -26.4 -0.8 -27.2 .32 .00 .31 
50-100 Q 
Subtotal: 4 
AT-LARGE 
0-9.9 28 -4.6 -0.3 -4.9 .00 .00 .00 
10-29.9 29 -12. 1 -11.5 -23.6 .32 .00 .20 
30-49.9 26 -32.6 -0.6 -33.2 . 14 .00 .13  
50-100 _a -25.8 -1.2 -27.0 .49 .83 .53 
Subtotal: 91 
Grand Total: 100 
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TABLE4-B 
Mean Equity Measures 
Comparing Percent Minority On City Council in 1989 
with Percent Minority in Population in 1980 
North Carolina Cities 
ELECTION EQUITY I: DIFFERENCE EQUITY II: RATIO 
TYPE BY 
MINORITY 
POPULATION 
N BLACK IND MIN BLACK IND MIN 
SMD 
10-29.9 1 -13.7 -0.4 -14. 1 .00 .00 .00 
30-49.9 8 -0.5 -0. l -0.6 .99 .00 .98 
50-100 __±_ -3.3 -6.0 -9.3 .93 .32 .83 
Subtotal: 13 
MIXED 
10-29.9 5 -3.7 -0.2 -3.9 .83 .00 .82 
30-49.9 8 -1.0 -0.4 -1.4 .97 .00 .96 
50-100 _1 -36.4 -0.1 -36.3 .52 .00 .52 
Subtotal: 14 
AT-LARGE 
10-29.9 346 -16.2 -0.4 -16.6 . 14 .00 . 14 
30-49.9 216 -32.7 -1. 1  -33 .8  . 14 .00 . 14 
50-100 140 -47 . 1  -8.9 -56.0 . 15 . 10 . 14 
Subtotal: 702 
Grand Total: 729 
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TABLES-A 
Changes in Representation Between 1973 and 1989 
North Carolina Counties 
(Ratio Equity Measure) 
ELECTION EQUITY RATIO 1973 EQUITY RATIO 1989 
TYPE BY 
MINORITY 
POPULATION 
N BLACK IND MIN BLACK IND MIN 
AL-SMD 
0-9.9 I .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
10-29.9 I .00 .00 .00 .57 .00 .56 
30-49.9 3 .00 .00 .00 . 8 1  .00 . 8 1  
50-100.0 Q 
Subtotal: 5 
AL-MIXED 
0-9. 9  0 
10-29.9 I .00 .00 .00 .54 .00 .53 
30-49.9 3 .00 .00 .00 .32 .00 .32 
50-100.0 Q 
Subtotal: 4 
UNCHANGED SYSTEMS 
AT-LARGE 
0-9.9 28 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
10-29.9 28 . I O  .00 .09 . 1 8  .00 . 17 
30-49.9 25 .08 .00 .08 . 12 .00 . 12 
50-100 _]. . 1 0  .00 .09 .49 .83 .53 
Subtotal: 89 
Grand Total: 98 
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TABLES-B 
Changes in Representation Between 1973 and 1989 
North Carolina Cities 
(Ratio Equity Measure) 
EQUITY RA TIO 1973 EQUITY RATIO 1989 
ELECTION 
TYPE BY 
MINORITY 
POPULATION 
N BLACK IND MIN BLACK IND MIN 
AL-SMD 
10-29.9 1 1.20 .00 1.20 .00 .00 .00 
30-49.9 5 .08 .00 .08 .78 .00 .78 
50-100.0 J . 1 1  .00 . 1 1  .90 .00 .90 
Subtotal: 9 
AL-MIXED 
10-29.9 5 .31  .00 . 3 1  .84 .00 .84 
30-49.9 7 .32 .00 .32 .69 .00 .69 
50-100.0 L .00 .00 .00 .52 .00 .52 
Subtotal: 13 
UNCHANGED SYSTEMS 
AT-LARGE 
10-29.9 346 .04 .00 .04 . 14 .00 . 14 
30-49.9 216 .03 .00 .03 . 14 .00 . 14 
50-100.0 140 .02 .00 .02 .15 .70 . 14 
Subtotal: 702 
Grand Total: 724 
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TABLE6-A 
Minority Represention in 
Single Member Districts in 1989 
North Carolina Counties 
TYPE BY POPULATION IN DISTRICT COUNCIL MEMBERS IN DISTRICT 
MINORITY 
POPULATION 
N BLACK IND MIN BLACK IND MIN 
% BLACK 
0-29.9 7 12.0 0.2 12.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
30-49.9 4 36.6 0.3 36.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
50-100 -1 63.4 0 .1  64.5 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Subtotal: 15 
%INDIAN 
0-29.9 15 37.3 0.2 37.5 33.3 0.0 33.3 
Subtotal: 15 
/ 
% MINORITY 
0-29.9 7 12.0 0.2 12.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
30-49.9 4 36.6 0.3 36.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
50-100 -1 63.4 0.1 63.5 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Subtotal: 15 
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TABLE 6-B 
Minority Represention in 
Single Member Districts in 1989 
North Carolina Cities 
TYPE BY POPULATION IN DISTRICT COUNCIL MEMBERS IN DISTRICT 
MINORITY 
POPULATION 
N BLACK IND MIN BLACK IND MIN 
% BLACK 
0-29.9 16 9.4 2.7 12. 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
30-49.9 3 36.3 18.3 54.6 66.7 33.3 100.0 
50-100 .11_ 69.8 1.7 71.5 84.6 0.0 84.6 
Subtotal: 30 
%INDIAN 
0-29.9 29 3 1 .4 2.8 34.2 46.2 0.0 46.2 
30-49.9 _J 35.1 46.4 81.5 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Subtotal: 30 
% MINORITY 
0-29.9 16 9.4 2.7 12. 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
30-49.9 2 32.0 4.2 41.2 100.0 0.0 100.0 
50-100 12 66.9 5.4 72.3 78.6 7. 1 85.7 
Subtotal: 30 
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ELECTION 
TYPE BY 
MINORITY 
POPULATION 
MAJORITY' 
BLACK MAJ. 
INDIAN MAJ. 
WHITE MAJ. 
Subtotal: 
TABLE7-A 
Minority Represention in Single Member Districts 
In 1989 As a Function of Plurality Groups Within a District 
North Carolina Counties 
POPULATION IN DISTRICT COUNCIL MEMBERS IN DISTRICT 
N BLACK IND MIN BLACK IND MIN 
4 63.4 0. 1 63.5 100.0 0.0 100.0 
0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
l! 22.5 0.2 22.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
15 
1 There are no pluralities in count ie s .  
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TABLE7-B 
Minority Represention in Single Member Districts 
In 1989 As a Function of Plurality Groups Within a District 
North Carolina Cities 
ELECTION POPULATION IN DISTRICT COUNCIL MEMBERS IN DISTRICT 
TYPE BY 
MINORITY 
POPULATION 
N BLACK IND MIN BLACK IND MIN 
MAJORITY 
BLACK MAJ. 1 1  69.8 1.7 71 .5 84.6 0.0 84.6 
INDIAN MAJ. O' 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
WHITE MAJ. 1.§. 1 1.2 2.5 13.7 10.5 0.0 10.5 
Subtotal: 29 
PLURALITY 
BLACK PLUR. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
INDIAN PLUR. 1 35.1 46.4 81 .5 0.0 100.0 0.0 
WHITE PLUR. Q 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Subtotal: 1 
Grand Total: 30 
1 Native Americans have a plurality o f  total population i n  three cities and a majority i n  thirteen cities but all o f  the cities have 
at-large systems and so are excluded. 
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County 
by Type Year of 
of Change Change 
AL-SMD 
Guilford 1983 
Wilson 1985 
Vance 1987 
Craven 1987 
Nash 1988 
Pitt 1988 
Duplin 1989 
Anson 1989 
Granville 1989 
Hamett 1989 
Sampson 1989 
Total Changes: 1 1  
Total Lawsuits: 9 
AL-Mixed 
Washington 1970 
Mecklenburg 1984 
Halifax 1984 
Camden 1986 
Pasquotank 1986 
Chowan 1987 
Bladen 1988 
Lenoir 1988 
Pamlico 1988 
Wayne 1988 
Caswell 1989 
TABLES-A 
Causes of Changes from At-Large 
To Single Member District or Mixed Systems, 
North Carolina Counties, 1965-19911 
VRA?2 Lawsuit? 
(Yes/No) (Yes/No) Result 
yes yes Settled 
yes yes Summary judgment 
yes yes Settled 
yes no Resolution 
yes yes Prelim. injunction, then settled 
yes yes Consent decree 
no yes Consent judgment 
yes no Resolution 
yes yes Court-ordered remedy' 
yes yes Settled 
no yes Settled 
yes no Resolution 
yes no Referendum' 
yes yes Prelim. injunction, then settled 
yes no Resolution' 
yes yes Settled 
yes no Resolution 
yes yes Consent judgment 
yes yes Consent decree 
no yes Consent decree 
yes yes Settled 
yes yes Settled 
1 The total numbers of counties and cities changed to single member districts and mixed systems in Tables 8-A and 8-B do not 
match the totals from the previous tables because these tables incorporate counties and cities which changed before 1973 and after 
1991 and which have less than 10 percent minority population. In several cases changes occurred recently enough that the county or 
city has not yet had an election under the new system. 
2 This column in Tables -8-A .and- 8-B js,unique to ·this .chapter on North Carolina. , -It indicates whether the county or city in 
question is "covered" by the Voting Rights Act. Only 40 of North Carolina's 100 counties-and the towns and cities within-are 
included in the preclearance provisions of Section Five. Any city or county in the state, however, can have a Section Two Jaw suit filed 
against it. 
3 See text pp. 28-29 for more detail. 
4 Voters rejected the referendum for a switch from a five commissioner at-large system to one with three commissioners elected at­
large and four ele1;ted at-large to districts. Tuey approved i.he shift to a mixed system with three at-iarge and four district seats. 
' The county commission passed the mixed plan in 1977. The Justice Department did not approve it until 1986. 
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Forsyth 1989 no yes Settled 
Cumberland 1990 yes yes Plan adopted after suit filed6 
Montgomery 1990 no yes Consent decree 
Lee 1991 yes yes Consent decree 
Perguimmans 1992 yes no Resolution 
Total Changes: 16 
Total Lawsuits: 1 1  
6 See Crow�ll. 
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TABLE8-B 
Causes of Changes from At-Large 
To Single Member District or Mixed Systems, 
North Carolina Cities, 1965-1991 
City 
by Type Year of VRA? Lawsuit? 
of Change Chan!!e (Yes/No) (Yes/No) Result 
AL-SMD 
Winston-
Salem 1947 no no Resolution1 
Tarboro pre-1965 yes no Resolution 
Plymouth pre-1965 yes no Ordinance2 
Lumberton 1967 yes no General Assembly' 
Princeville 1977 yes no Ordinance 
New Bern 1985 yes no Resolution 
Rocky Mount 1985 yes yes Settled 
Wilson 1986 yes no Resolution 
Elizabeth 
City 1986 yes yes Settled' 
Dunn 1987 yes yes Consent decree 
Freemont 1987 yes no Resolution, law suit threat 
Goldsboro 1987 yes no Resolution 
Clinton 1989 no yes Consent decree 
Total Changes: 13 
Total Lawsuits: 4 
AL-Mixed 
Randleman pre-1965 no no Resolution 
Raleigh 1973 no no Referendum 
Cary 1975 no no Ordinance 
Charlotte 1977 no no Referendum 
Greensboro 1983 no no Ordinance' 
Statesville 1985 no yes Consent order 
Fayetteville 1986 no no Ordinance 
Greenville 1986 yes no Resolution 
Henderson 1986 yes no Ordinance 
High Point 1986 yes yes Consent decree 
1 See text p. 9 for more detail. 
1 The city council passed the change after the Justice Department threatened suit. 
3 The General Assembly codified the city council's resolution. 
4 The law suit was settled after two injunctions had been granted and after the city's alternative plan had been rejected by the 
Justice Department. 
� Tile city councii passed an ordinance to create the 3 at-large, 5 district system after the plan had been defeated as a referendum 5 
times since 1968. Under the at·large scheme, however, blacks had been elected to the city council and school board in roughly 
proportionate numbers since the 1950s. 
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Lexington 1986 no yes Settled 
Enfield 1987 yes no Resolution, law suit threat 
Mooresville 1987 no no Resolution 
Thomasville 1987 no yes Settled 
Albemarle 1988 no yes Settled 
Edenton 1989 yes no Resolution 
Benson 1989 no yes Settled 
Siler City 1989 no yes Plan adopted after suit filed 
Smithfield 1989 no yes Plan adopted after suit filed 
Total Changes: 19 
Total Lawsuits: 8 
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TABLE9-A 
Challenges to Multimember Districts, 
North Carolina Counties, 1965-1991 
List of Cases Year Result� Citation Plaintiffs Lawyers 
Simkins v Guilford Co. 1983 Settled (7D) C-83-391G Leslie J. Winner 
Jack Greenburg 
Johnson v. Halifax Co./ 1984 Prelim. injunc- 83-48-CIV-8 Leslie J. Winner 
US v Halifax Co. tion. Settled 83-88-CIV-8 Jack Greenburg 
(3D/3AL) dcnc 594 Lanier Guinier 
fsupp 161  Steven Rosenbaum 
Poli Marmolijos 
Haskins v Co. of Wilson 1985 Summ. judge. 82-19-CIV-8 Leslie Winner 
G. K. Butterfield 
Peter Sherwood 
Jack Greenburg 
Lanier Gunier 
NAACP v Pasquotank Co. 1986 Settled 83-39-CIV-2 Ronald Penny 
(4D/3AL) 84-14-CIV-2 Harold Barnes 
Ellis v Vance Co. 1987 Consent decree 87-28-CIV-5 Leslie Winner 
(7D) G. K. Butterfield 
Jackson v Nash Co. 1988 Prelim. injunc- 86-150-CIV-5 Leslie Winner 
tion, settled (7D) 
Harry v Bladen Co. 1988 Consent judge. 87-72-CIV-7 Leslie Winner 
James Wall 
US v Lenoir Co. 1988 Settled 
(5D/2AL) 
NAACP v Pamlico Co. 1988 Consent decree 87-6-CIV-4 Angus Thompson 
(2AL/5D) Romallus Murphy 
NAACP v Wayne Co. 1988 Settled 86-1091-CIV-5 Harold Barnes 
(1AL/6D) Ronald Penny 
Pitt Co. Concerned 
Citizens v Brd of Comm. 1988 Consent decree 87-129-CIV-4 Leslie Winner 
(9D) 
NAACP v Caswell Co. 1989 Settled C-86-676-G Romallus Murphy 
(2AL/6D) Angus Thompson 
NAACP v Forsyth Co. 1989 Consent decree C-86-803 Romallus Murphy 
(1AL/6D) Angus Thompson 
NAACP v Duplin Co. 1989 Consent judge. 88-5-CIV-7 Angus Thompson 
(6D) 
McGhee v Granville Co. 1989 see text p. 31  87-29-CIV-5 Leslie Winner 
(7D) 860 F2d 1 IO (CA4) 
Porter v Hamett . Co. .1989 ..Settled .88-950-CIV-5 Donnell Van 
(SD) Noppen 
US v Sampson Co. 1989 Settled 88-121-CIV-5 Cirus Faircloth 
(5D) Donnell Van 
Noppen 
1 The information in parentheses tells what type of system the county or city switched to as a result of the lawsuit. The 
numbers indicate the number of commissioners or council persons. D = single-member districts, AUD = mixed system. 
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Fayetteville Black Caucus 1990 Plan adopted after 88-22-CIV-3 Leon Lee 
suit filed, 
plaint. appealing 
(5D/2AL) 
NAACP v Montgomery Co. 1990 Consent decree C-90-27-R Anita Hodgkiss 
(1AL/4D) Leslie Winner 
Romallus Murphy 
Sellars v Lee Co. 1991 Consent decree C-89-294-D Dennis Hayes 
(3AL/4D) Romallus Murphy 
Person v Moore Co. pending C-89-135-R Steve Edelstein 
Kathleen Wilde 
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TABLE 9-B 
Challenges to Multimember Districts, 
North Carolina Cities, 1965-1991 
List of Cases Year Result Citation Plaintiffs Lawyers 
Green v City of Rocky Mount 198S Settled 83-81-CIV-8 Sue Perry 
(SD) 
NAACP v City of Statesville 198S Consent order St-C-84-149 Angus Thompson 
(3AL/6D) dcnc 606 FSupp Charles Carter 
S69 Romallus Murphy 
Margaret Ford 
NAACP v Elizabeth City 1986 Settled' 83-39-ClV-2 Harold Barnes 
(SD) Ronald Penny 
Langford v City of 1986 Consent decree C-86-147-G Norman Smith 
High Point (2AL/6D) Davidson Douglas 
NAACP v City of Lexington 1986 Compromise C-86-370-S Romallus Murphy 
and Settled Angus Thompson 
(2AL/6D) Grover Hankins 
McLean v City of Dunn 1987 Consent decree 88-117-CIV-3 Donnell Van 
(7D) Noppen 
NAACP v City of 1987 Settled C-86-291-S Romallus Murphy 
Thomasville (2AL/SD) Angus Thompson 
Charles Carter 
NAACP v City of Albemarle 1988 Settled C-87-468-S Romallus Murphy 
(3AL/4D) Angus Thompson 
Hall v City of Clinton 1989 Consent decree 88-117-ClV-3 Donnell Van 
(6D) Noppen 
Johnson v Town of Benson 1989 Settled 88-240-ClV-S Donnell Van 
(3AL/3D) Noppen 
Patterson v Siler City 1989 Dismissed C-88-701-D Alice Ratliff 
(2AL/SD) Walter Bennett 
Laughlin McDonald 
Sewell v Town of 1989 Plan adopted 89-360-CIV-SD Donnell Van 
Smithfield after suit filed Noppen 
(4AL/3D) 
Hines v Callis & Town pending 89-63-CIV-2-BO Kathleen Wilde 
of Ahoskie Steve Edelstein 
NAACP v City of pending 91-36-C!V-2-BO Romallus Murphy 
Roanoke Rapids 
1 Settled after two injunctions, and after rejection of remedial plan by the Justice Department. 
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TABLE lO 
Legal Disfranchising Devices in North Carolina 
DEVICE DATE ESTABLISED DATE ABOLISHED 
Literacy Test 19001 1965, 19702 
Grandfather Clause 19001 19083 
Poll Tax 19001 19204 
1 Constitutional Amendments. 
2 Voting Rights Act of 1965 and amendments of 1970. 
3 Automatic expiration in Constitutional Amendments. 
' Repeal. 
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TABLE 1 1  
Black and White Voter Registration, and 
Black Membership in the North Carolina 
General Assem bly,  Selected Years 1 
Voter Registration Black Membership 
1 9 6 22 
Black White House Senate 
% YAP % Total % Y A P  % Total 
Reg. Reg.3 Reg. Reg. 
36% 1 0% 93% 89.6% 0 0 
1 966 
Black White House Senate 
% YAP % Total % VAP % Total 
Reg. Reg. Reg. Reg. 
5 1  qio 1 4.2% 82% 8 5 . 1 %  o• os
1 9 9 0  
Black White House Senate 
% VAP % Total % VAP % Total 
Reg. Reg. Reg. Reg. 
63% 1 7% 68.6% 83% 1 36 47 
1 Mean Black Population 1960-1990 = 22.13.
2 1962 are the mo•t recent pre-YRA registration figures available. 
3 Registration figures do not include other than black and white so they do not add up to 100%. 
4 The first black representative was elected in 1968. The total number is 120. 
5 The first black senator was elected in 1974. The total number is 50. 
6 In the 1990 election a native American was elected bringing the total number of minority representative:i to 14 in 1991. 
7 An additional black :senator was elected in 1990. 
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We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments by Thad L .  Beyle, Merle Black, William A. 
Campbell, William Chafe, James C. Drennan, Donald Horowitz, J. Morgan Kousser, Laurie 
Mesibov, Paul Luebke, William S. Powell, John L. Sanders, and Leslie J. Winner; the research 
assistance and comments of Patrick Rivers; and the technical assistance of Julie Daniel and Eloisa 
Imel. 
I. For more on this, see Kousser (1 980). 
2. While 46.8% of the black voting age population was registered in 1964, this compared to 96.8%
for whites. Both figures are inflated by the state's failure to purge voting lists of voters who were 
deceased or had moved. See Gingles exhibit 38 and Gingles Stipulation 58, n. 2. 
3. 590 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. N. C. 1984).
4. Allison v. Sharo, 209 N.C. 477 ( 1936), quoted in N.C. Advisory Commission, 1962, p. 16.
5.  Lassiter v.  Northhampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 ( 1959). 
6. Bazemore v. Bertie County Board of Elections, 254 N.C. 398 ( 1961) .
7 .  The case was Dunston v .  Scott, 336 F. Supp. 206 ( 1972). See Suitts, 1 98 1 ,  pp. 67-70. 
8.  Gaston v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) 
9. See Gingles transcript at 429, testimony by Board of Elections Chairman Robert Spearman, and
defendant's exhibits. 
10. Allen v. State Board of Elections, 
I I .  See Black Elected Officials: A National Roster (1 990). 
12. For an analysis of this contest, see Eamon, 1 987.
13. If the appointment occurs in the 60 days preceding the election, it runs to the succeeding
election. 
14. Haith v. Martin, 6 18  F. Supp. 410  (E.D.N.C. 1985).
15. Alexander v. Martin, No. 86- 1 048-CIV-5, (E.D.N.C., filed Oct. 2, 1986).
16. Chapter 509 of the North Carolina Session Laws of 1987.
47 
1 7 .  Dr.ennan .observes. that the law "all butguarantees that the judges in at least eight districts will 
be black" ( 1 990, p. 33). 
1 8. These were Judge Fullwood in district 5, and Judge Sumner in district 7A. 
19. Nearly two dozen district court judges are black out of a total of 127 (Drennan, 1990, footnote
28, p .  21) .  
20. 590 F.Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984). On appeal, this case was upheld in part by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 ( 1 986). 
2 1 .  Gingles, note 27 at p. 367. 
22. Johnson v. Halifax County, 594 F. Supp. 1 6 1  (E.D.N.C. 1984).
23. In these lawsuits challenging the method of electing the Cumberland County board of
commissioners, and the Siler City city council, the defendants had already changed from at large 
before the districting, and the plaintiffs challenged the new districting system. 
24. Leslie Winner supervised research on litigation, and contributed to our report on this topic.
25. McGhee v. Granville County, 860 F.2d 1 10 (4th Cir. 1988).
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